EDITORIAL INFORMATION

This is the fourth publication in a new series of special studies prepared by the NASA History Office. The Monographs in Aerospace History series is designed to provide a wide variety of investigations relative to the history of aeronautics and space. These publications are intended to be tightly focused in terms of subject, relatively short in lenght, and reproduced in an inexpensive format to allow timely and broad dissemination to researchers in aerospace history.

(Extracted from the Foreword, by Roger D. Launius.)

GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

-Foreword. Roger D. Launius.

-Table of Contents.

-Introduction.

-Brown's Lunar Exploration Working Group.

-Michael's Paper on a "Parking Orbit".

-The Rendezvous Committees.

-The Feelings Against Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous.

-The Space Task Group's Early Skepticism.

-Mounting Frustration.

-President Kennedy's Commitment.

-Houbolt's First Letter to Seamans.

-A Voice in the Wilderness.

-The LOR Decision.

-Conclusion.

-Notes.

-Key Documents.

OUR REVIEW

Despite its brevity, we have here a work worthy of a great deal of interest and importance. In it what is discussed amounts to nothing less than one of the most transcendental historical events in the Apollo program, that of the choice for the most adequate method needed for the lunar descent, which at that time meant the difference between succeeding or failing in such a magnificient enterprise. Hansen describes the situation with a thorough clarity in some twenty pages, leaving the remaining space for the copious notes and references and - what's more interesting still, the reproduction of the key documents that gave rise to the making of the big decision.

Engineer John Houbolt was the champion for the idea: to put a ship on orbit around the Moon, make a specially prepared vehicle descend to its surface, and renew then the connection so as to make it possible for the astronauts to return to Earth. This, which may now appear to be so obvious, was not contemplated in such a good light then, since it implied a complex dance for rendezvouses and space dockings. Instead, a direct trip to the Moon surface was preferred, yet this also meant the use of a heavier vehicle and bigger rockets. Houbolt's proposal, finally, can be considered to have saved the Apollo program, as otherwise it would have been impossible to accomplish the order given by President Kennedy on time. It is curious to learn now that even the Soviets chose this system for their own manned lunar flight N-1/L-3. The description of how Houbolt succeeded in getting his idea to win over the opposition by other engineers and its key role in the success of the Apollo program constitutes the main objective in this monograph.